

S-E-C-R-E-T

28 August 1956

USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, Guided Missile Intelligence
Committee (GMIC)

SUBJECT : Proposed US/USSR Guided Missile Installations
Exchange Visit

1. The IAC Standing Committee on Exchanges has requested that this Committee provide the necessary advice for review by the Standing Committee on Exchanges regarding an Air Force proposal for reciprocal visits to US/USSR guided missile installations (Attachment A).

2. An exchange of this nature would seem to provide a patent intelligence gain after superficial examination of its intelligence potentiality. However, it must be recognized that there are inherent security implications in this proposal which must be considered in order to avoid serious compromises of our national defense effort.

3. In order to derive the best possible advice from within our Committee organization, I propose that each Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC) member designate a representative to serve on an ad hoc working group for guided missile installations exchange visits. A Chairman will be designated by the Chairman, GMIC, from among the representatives appointed to the working group. The Secretary of the working group will be provided from the GMIC Secretariat Staff.

For your information I have attached a brief outline of a proposed approach to the problem (Attachment B). This approach follows

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the pattern indicated in the materials provided the GMIC Secretariat by the Standing Committee on Exchanges. Within this outline, I propose that the working group would provide all the necessary information under Items I and II for GMIC review. The working group could then provide a preliminary draft on the net intelligence advantage (Par. III).

5. It is requested that each member be prepared to discuss this proposed exchange at the next meeting. It is further requested that each member be prepared to nominate his representative to the ad hoc working group should this be an acceptable procedure.

George H. Wilson
GEORGE H. WILSON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Chairman, GMIC

Attachment:
As Stated

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Attachment A
13 July 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee

SUBJECT: Proposed US-USSR Guided Missile Installations
Exchange Visit

1. The Air Force has requested that the Standing Committee on Exchanges consider the advisability of an exchange involving reciprocal visits to US-USSR guided missiles installations. This request is based on a remark that Khrushchev made to General Twining suggesting that such an exchange might be considered by the Soviets, and new NSC policy paper on exchanges. It is hereby requested that your committee provide the advice that is necessary for a review of this proposal.

2. The information necessary for the Committee to have is outlined in "Intelligence Advice Concerning Proposed Exchanges" and the related discussion in IAC-D-103. [redacted] of your Office has been provided copies of both of these documents. The most important element in the decision of the Committee concerns the net advantage. This involves weighing US intelligence gain against Soviet intelligence and technological gain. Should you find it necessary to attach conditions to your estimate, please outline those conditions in detail. Any additional items not covered in the above documents that might aid the Committee in making an intelligent appraisal of the proposal will be appreciated.

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Attachment B
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I. ITINERARY

A. USSR

The itinerary should include those installations which will provide the maximum observation intelligence targets within our gaps of intelligence information (e.g. - test ranges, factories, operational units). The order of priority of visits to installations should be indicated together with the intelligence justification for the priority assigned to the installation.

B. US

ILLEGIB

Itineraries within the US is not of primary concern to the intelligence community [] however, suggestions will be useful and in many instances it must be recognized that the exchange will be effected on a quid pro quo basis. This will have a tempering influence on the priorities assigned visits to installations in the USSR.

II. PERSONNEL

Indicate types and sources of personnel suitable for inclusion in a US delegation. Name individuals if possible.

III. NET INTELLIGENCE ADVANTAGE

Estimate the balance of US intelligence gain as contrasted with the Soviet intelligence and technological gain.